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Abstract: The classic arguments of Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) are that the 
redistribution and stabilization functions should be assigned to the federal level of 
government.  The argument is that redistribution is difficult to achieve at lower levels 
because the public good nature of redistribution and the mobility of individuals and firms.  
Likewise, stabilization is difficult to achieve because fiscal stimulus of lower levels of 
government is likely to be underused due to spillover effects and a limited ability to 
service debt obligations.  These arguments suggest that under-provision of redistributive 
spending should accompany greater decentralization. They also suggest that subnational 
policies aimed at macroeconomic stabilization are likely to be less effective than national 
ones, an important issue in an economic crisis.  In this paper I examine data on intra-
country social protection transfers in the EU before and after the crisis. The results 
support the classic federalism assignment.  For both reasons of redistribution and 
stabilization, social protection expenditures are best assigned to the central level of 
government.   Regression results indicate that greater decentralization lowers social 
protection expenditures and a greater vertical fiscal imbalance and greater subnational 
deficits result in more spending on things other than social protection. 
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I. Introduction 
 The Great Recession was a large shock in the European Union.  Every single 
country in the EU entered a recession in the years between 2008 and 2014.  The length 
and depth of the recession varied across countries, however.  As detailed in Table 1, the 
number of quarters in recession (measured as negative GDP growth) between 2008 and 
2014 varied from a low of 5 in France and 6 in Germany to a high of 18 in Spain and 19 
in Greece, with an average of 10.8.  Between 2000 and 2007 the average number of 
quarters of negative growth was 2.4.  The average unemployment rate (measured by an 
EU standardized rate) was 4.5 percent form 2000-2007 and rose to 6.4 percent 
afterwards.  The variation across countries was notable.  Table 1 shows that in Spain 
and Greece the unemployment rate doubled, while in Germany it fell from a 6.5 percent 
average from 2000-2007 to a 4.0 percent average from 2008 to 2014. 
Table 1 also shows that social protection expenditures in these Eurozone EU 
countries increased on average from 23 percent of GDP in 2000-2007 to 26.2 percent of 
GDP in 2008-2014.  Again one observes significant variation across countries that to 
some extent mirror differences in the depth of the recession.  Hard hit countries like 
Spain, Greece, and Ireland saw social protection transfers increase by 4.3, 6.1 and 4.5 
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Table 1 
Social Protection, Unemployment and Recession Length 


























Austria 27.3% 28.2% 1.0% 2 7 2.9% 3.3% 
Belgium 26.0% 28.1% 2.1% 4 8 4.5% 4.7% 
Finland 25.2% 28.5% 3.3% 0 14 5.7% 5.4% 
France 27.9% 31.0% 3.1% 0 5 5.1% 5.7% 
Germany 27.9% 27.7% -0.1% 2 6 6.5% 4.0% 
Greece 19.2% 25.3% 6.1% 4 19 5.7% 11.2% 
Ireland 15.6% 20.1% 4.5% 2 10 2.9% 7.7% 
Italy 23.9% 27.6% 3.8% 7 12 4.4% 5.4% 
Luxembourg 19.1% 22.2% 3.1% 3 9 2.6% 3.3% 
Netherlands 24.0% 27.4% 3.4% 0 8 2.4% 3.8% 
Portugal 20.8% 24.4% 3.6% 5 13 4.6% 8.5% 
Spain 19.4% 23.7% 4.3% 0 18 6.2% 13.8% 
        
Average  23.0% 26.2% 3.2% 2.4 10.8 4.5% 6.4% 
        
 
*Unemployment rate is Eurostat adjusted series which is adjusted to try to standardize 
across countries. 
Source: Author calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
The Great Recession was thus a large shock to the EU in which intra-country 
social protection transfers were used extensively.  At the same time EU rules on budget 
deficits put a limit on the degree to which countries, including their lower levels of 
government, could borrow to increase social transfers, and the crisis has revived a 
debate about inter-country fiscal transfers.  In this paper I compute measures of 
decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance and examine how these measures affected 
intra-country social protection expenditures in the EU before and after the crisis. 
The paper is related to several strands of the previous literature on 
decentralization.  Fundamentally, the classic arguments of Musgrave (1959) and Oates 
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(1972) are that the redistribution and stabilization functions should be assigned to the 
federal level of government.  The classic argument is that redistribution is difficult to 
achieve at lower levels of government in part because of the public good nature of 
redistribution and in part because of the mobility of individuals and firms. For instance, 
Oates (1972, p. 33) argues1:  
Even though members of all jurisdictions may wish a more egalitarian 
distribution of income within the society as a whole, it requires concerted 
action on the part of all subcentral governments to achieve the desired 
result; any single local government is seriously constrained in its 
capacity to alter substantially the existing distribution of income. 
While it may be argued that mobility is lower in Europe than in the US, the EU is meant 
to facilitate movement of labor and capital and the recent strong movement of firms in 
response to separatist rhetoric within Spain suggests that mobility is an important factor 
to consider in Europe.  The classic argument with respect to macroeconomic 
stabilization policy is that fiscal stimulus of lower levels of government is likely to be 
underused because of spillover effects and a limited ability to service debt obligations.2 
These fundamental arguments suggest that decentralization and the finance of 
subnational governments (SNGs) may affect social protection spending in a number of 
ways.  First, expenditures on goods with external benefits at the subnational level may 
lead to inefficient competition between jurisdictions.  While much has been written 
about competition in taxes, there is less work on competition involving expenditures.3  
                                                          
1 For perspectives on the mobility issue see for instance Epple and Romer (1991) and Goodspeed (1989). 
2 Carlino and Inman (2013) find evidence supporting the positive spillover argument in the US and quote 
Oates as follows: “The case for having the central government assume primary  responsibility for the 
stabilization function appears, therefore, to rest on a firm economic foundation. (L)ocal government 
cannot use conventional stabilization tools to much effect and must instead rely mainly on beggar-thy-
neighbor policies, which from a national standpoint are likely to produce far from the desired results. 
The central government, on the other hand, is free to adopt monetary policies and fiscal programs 
involving deficit finance; consequently, the stabilization problem must be resolved primarily at the 
central government level.” (Oates, 1972, p.30). 
3 For recent surveys on tax competition see for instance Keen and Konrad (2013) and Devereux and 
Loretz (2013).  The literature on expenditure competition started perhaps with Case, Hines and Rosen 
(1993).  See also the discussion and references in Brueckner (2000). 
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If redistribution exhibits characteristics of a public good, downward expenditure 
competition would be likely at the subnational level as regional governments would be 
caught in a type of prisoner’s dilemma in which each region would like to increase 
expenditures but is not convinced that other regions would do the same.  Or, said 
another way, if social protection expenditures have positive spillovers, economic theory 
suggests that under-provision is a likely outcome, and greater under-provision should 
accompany greater decentralization. 
The financing of subnational governments may also affect social protection 
expenditures.  It is well accepted that efficient incentives require subnational 
governments to fund expenditures from their own taxes on the margin but transfers are 
also used extensively by all countries.  The gap between SNG spending and own-
revenue is sometimes referred to as the vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI).    Unfortunately, 
over-reliance on transfers (making transfers a more likely marginal source of funds) 
combined with subnational government expenditure responsibilities and weak 
institutions can lead to a soft budget constraint, which would imply inefficient spending 
on the part of subnational governments.4  A small but growing literature finds that 
transfer dependency negatively affects the government budget balance (e.g. Eyraud and 
Lusinyan, 2013) although de Mello (2000) finds this only for developing and not 
developed countries.   
Transfers from one level of government to another are also considered in the 
macroeconomic literature on smoothing shocks.  The evidence in this literature is 
however mainly for automatic stabilizers in the US.  Early contributions include Sachs 
                                                          
4 Boadway and Tremblay (2006) discuss optimal fiscal imbalance in a world of certainty while 
Goodspeed (2002) discusses the soft budget constraint problem and its political underpinnings in a 
federal system.  On the soft budget constraint problem see also the references in Goodspeed (2017). 
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and Sala-i-Martin (1991) who find on the order of 40 percent smoothing for the US 
although Von Hagen (1998) points out that the estimates of Sachs and Sala-i-Martin 
combine both permanent differences between states and temporary differences due to 
the business cycle.  Von Hagen considers the effect of transfers on the former as 
redistribution and the effect on the latter as insurance and when he differentiates 
between permanent and temporary differences he finds close to 50 percent smoothing of 
permanent differences but only 10 percent smoothing of temporary business cycle 
differences.  Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) expand on the channels through 
which smoothing takes place and find a higher estimate of 75 percent smoothing but 
this is due mainly to the integrated capital markets in the US.  
The main results of my paper indicate that greater decentralization lowers social 
protection as a percent of GDP and that this relationship does not significantly change 
with the onset of a crisis.5  This is consistent with the argument that redistributive 
spending such as social protection is harder to achieve at lower levels of government.6  
The paper is not able to answer exactly how this happens but the evidence suggests that 
funds may be shifted by SNGs towards spending on other categories, possibly by 
increasing deficits. 
The main results concerning vertical fiscal imbalance generally show that, when 
measured in two standard ways, an increase in the (lagged) VFI lowers social protection 
as a percent of GDP, but less so in a crisis.  The negative relationship implies that 
greater transfers allow SNGs to shift spending away from social protection and towards 
                                                          
5 The results of the paper hold as well with social protection measured per capita but these results are 
omitted to save space. 
6 Beramendi and Rogers (2017) address a somewhat different but related issue.  Some of their results 
are consistent, namely that more fiscally decentralized nations have more inequality and less 
redistribution.  However, using a difference in difference approach they find this to be greater after the 
Great Recession than before. 
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other spending categories, but that in a crisis the shifting is more limited.  When 
measured in a third way that includes the deficit there are some subtle differences. 
Overall, the results suggest that (1) when not in crisis a greater VFI (relatively greater 
transfers or transfers plus deficit) results in spending on things other than social 
protection, (2) transfers are used in part to limit decreases in social protection in a crisis, 
and (3) the evidence on deficits suggests that SNG deficits are used to fund 
expenditures other than social protection. 
The main policy conclusions from this analysis support the classic division of 
functions of government.  For both reasons of redistribution and stabilization, social 
protection expenditures are best assigned to the central level of government.  The 
evidence suggests that more decentralized systems provide less social protection and 
greater transfers or SNG deficits can be shifted to fund areas other than social 
protection.7 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses 
the panel data set and presents a fiscal description of the SNGs of the sample countries.  
Measures of decentralization and the vertical fiscal imbalance are calculated and 
presented for the countries of the sample both before and after 2007.  Section III 




                                                          
7 Lago-Peñas, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sacchi (2017) find that budget rules may be an important control 
for stability.  Our fixed country effect regressions control for this but it is less clear that such rules can 
prevent the shifting of funds.  
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II. Data and Fiscal Description of Subnational Governments 
 To examine the effects of decentralization and SNG transfer receipts on social 
protection expenditures I use a panel data set compiled from Eurostat and the OECD 
from 2000 to 2014 for the 12 countries that constitute the Eurozone in that period.  All 
nominal variables are converted to real 2010 euros.   
Data on social protection expenditures are from Eurostat.  Eurostat defines social 
protection as expenditures on sickness, healthcare and invalidism; disability; old age; 
parental responsibilities; the loss of a spouse or parent; unemployment; housing; and 
social exclusion. Eurostat is also the source for economic variables such as GDP and the 
employment rate as well as demographic variables such as population, the proportion 
young, the proportion old, the proportion female. Thus the data used for Table 1 is all 
from Eurostat.  The quarters of recession variable is computed by counting as a 
recessionary quarter one with negative GDP growth.  
Data on fiscal variables at the subnational and national level are from the OECD 
and include subnational transfer receipts, subnational expenditures, subnational own 
revenue where subnational is defined as state (or regional) plus local governments.  In 
addition, the OECD is the source for total government expenditures and revenues (at all 
levels of government).  Tables 2, 3, and 4 present computations based on the OECD 
data for SNG transfer receipts (Table 2), measures of decentralization (Table 3) and 
measures of the vertical fiscal imbalance (Table 4) all computed from the OECD data.  
While the Eurostat system of national and regional accounts (ESA) is a potential 
alternative source for fiscal data, among the difficulties in using this source is that 2010 
saw a definitional change in own taxes.  This and other issues are avoided by using the 
OECD data. 
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Table 2 details SNG receipts of transfers from the central government as 
reported by the OECD, comparing the averages from 2000-2007 with 2008-2014.  
Almost all countries saw an increase in SNG transfer receipts in absolute euros per 
capita.  Ireland, which experienced a large fall, is the main exception but this appears 
due to a transfer of many of the expenditures of SNGs to the central government as seen 
in Table 3.  Greece and Portugal also experienced a fall.  The largest increases in per 
capita terms were in Finland, Luxembourg, and Austria.  As a percent of GDP these 
countries saw increases of 1.8%, 0.6%, and 0.3% in SNG transfer receipts.  As a percent 
of social protection expenditures, SNG transfers were more varied.  Eight countries 
experienced falls in SNG transfers as a percent of social protection expenditures.  As 
SNG transfers were rising for most countries, social protection expenditures were 
apparently not rising by as much in some countries.   
Table 2 
Subnational Government Transfer Receipts 
 
Country SNG Transfers 
(% of GDP) 
SNG Transfers 
(% of SP) 
SNG Transfers 
(per capita, euros) 
 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 
Austria 12.2% 12.4% 44.5% 44.0% 4047 4478 
Belgium 13.0% 13.3% 50.0% 47.4% 4131 4482 
Finland 4.9% 6.6% 19.3% 23.2% 1628 2322 
France 2.9% 3.3% 10.4% 10.8% 877 1044 
Germany 4.4% 4.7% 15.8% 16.8% 1297 1528 
Greece 2.4% 2.3% 12.6% 9.3% 482 448 
Ireland 8.6% 2.3% 56.8% 11.9% 3108 905 
Italy 5.7% 6.3% 24.1% 22.9% 1613 1680 
Luxembourg 2.1% 2.7% 11.2% 12.2% 1619 2169 
Netherlands 9.8% 10.0% 40.9% 36.6% 3540 3822 
Portugal 2.1% 1.9% 9.9% 7.8% 341 315 
Spain 9.9% 10.2% 51.1% 43.3% 2296 2347 
       
Average 6.5% 6.3% 28.9% 23.8% 2082 2128 
 
Source: Author calculations based on OECD data. 
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 Two standard measures of decentralization are SNG own-revenue as a percent of 
total government revenue and SNG expenditures as a percent of total government 
expenditures. The former excludes transfers and any SNG deficit or surplus while the 
latter includes both of these. Table 3 computes these two measures from the OECD data 
and examines how these two decentralization measures changed before and after 2008.  
In terms of expenditure, five countries experienced a decrease in the decentralization 
measure while in terms of revenue seven countries saw an increase.  Overall, the picture 
is mixed with the measure of revenue decentralization expanding on average and the 
measure of expenditure decentralization contracting on average.  The difference is 
sometimes pronounced: Spain experiences an increase in decentralization on the 
revenue measure and a decrease on the expenditure measure.  Apart from Spain, Finland 
and Belgium see the largest increase in decentralization by revenue and also by 
expenditure.  Table 3 also illustrates the variation across countries in decentralization 
measures.  On both measures the most decentralized countries are Germany, Finland, 
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Table 3 
Measures of Decentralization before and after the Great Recession 
 
 






 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 Measure 1 Measure 2 
Austria 10.0% 9.7% 30.7% 30.8% -0.3% 0.1% 
Belgium 16.5% 18.5% 36.9% 38.6% 2.0% 1.7% 
Finland 25.2% 28.9% 37.3% 40.4% 3.7% 3.0% 
France 14.6% 15.6% 19.0% 20.1% 1.0% 1.1% 
Germany 34.4% 35.7% 37.9% 39.0% 1.3% 1.1% 
Greece 2.6% 2.9% 7.0% 6.4% 0.3% -0.6% 
Ireland 8.8% 6.5% 32.4% 10.4% -2.3% -22.0% 
Italy 19.2% 18.6% 30.6% 29.4% -0.5% -1.2% 
Luxembourg 7.1% 6.0% 12.1% 11.0% -1.1% -1.2% 
Netherlands 11.0% 9.8% 34.1% 32.0% -1.2% -2.1% 
Portugal 9.9% 10.8% 14.2% 13.4% 0.9% -0.8% 
Spain 23.7% 27.4% 46.0% 45.5% 3.7% -0.5% 
       
Average 15.3% 15.9% 28.2% 26.4% 0.6% -1.8% 
 
Notes: R = SNG Revenue; E = SNG Expenditure; TGR = Total Government Revenue; 
TGE = Total Government Expenditure 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on OECD data. 
 
 Table 4 examines the use of transfers by SNGs across countries via a measure of 
the vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) and also details how the VFI changed before and 
after 2008.  The VFI is measured in two ways: SNG transfers relative to SNG revenues 
and SNG transfers relative to SNG expenditures.  One of the interesting facts that can 
be gleaned from Table 4 is that the VFI generally improved among the countries hardest 
hit by the Great Recession.  Any rise in SNG transfers was apparently limited relative to 
any increase in SNG revenues or expenditures, resulting in a fall in VFI.  A possible 
reason for this, an increase in SNG deficits, is explored via an alternative VFI measure 
that is shown in Table 5. The alternative measure computes the VFI using transfers 
received plus the deficit in the numerator of the VFI measure.  The most striking results 
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are for Spain and Belgium where the change in the measured VFI before and after the 
Great Recession moves to positive, very significantly so in Spain.  Thus increased 
deficit financing at the subnational level appears to have been an important factor in 
some countries.  If ultimately these deficits must be covered by the central government, 
soft budget constraint issues arise.  This measure is also used as an alternative in the 
regressions and will be commented on further at that point of the paper. 
Table 4 
Measures of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance before and after the Great Recession 
(Excluding Deficit) 
 
Country Measure 1 
(T/R) 
Measure 2 
(T/E) Change in VFI 
 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 Measure 1 Measure 2 
Austria 71.2% 72.5% 77.0% 78.8% 1.3% 1.7% 
Belgium 61.2% 58.9% 69.8% 64.5% -2.2% -5.2% 
Finland 26.7% 29.9% 26.6% 29.6% 3.2% 3.0% 
France 28.6% 29.6% 29.3% 29.8% 1.0% 0.5% 
Germany 22.2% 22.9% 24.5% 26.6% 0.7% 2.0% 
Greece 69.2% 65.0% 71.7% 68.4% -4.3% -3.3% 
Ireland 68.1% 50.1% 68.0% 50.2% -17.9% -17.8% 
Italy 40.5% 42.2% 39.9% 43.1% 1.7% 3.3% 
Luxembourg 42.5% 50.6% 46.0% 57.5% 8.1% 11.5% 
Netherlands 67.7% 70.5% 66.7% 68.5% 2.8% 1.8% 
Portugal 34.4% 29.6% 32.7% 29.4% -4.8% -3.3% 
Spain 51.6% 50.6% 55.5% 51.2% -1.0% -4.3% 
       
Average 48.6% 47.7% 50.6% 49.8% -1.0% -0.8% 
 
Notes: T = SNG Transfer Receipts; R = SNG Revenue; E = SNG Expenditure 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on OECD data. 
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Alternative Measures of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance before and after the Great Recession 
(Including Deficit) 
 
Country Measure 1 
(T+D)/R 
Measure 2 
(T+D)/E Change in VFI 
 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 Measure 1 Measure 2 
Austria 63.7% 64.7% 68.9% 70.2% 1.1% 1.3% 
Belgium 48.9% 50.3% 55.8% 55.1% 1.4% -0.7% 
Finland 26.8% 30.8% 26.7% 30.5% 4.0% 3.8% 
France 26.3% 29.1% 26.9% 29.3% 2.7% 2.3% 
Germany 12.6% 9.1% 13.7% 10.4% -3.5% -3.3% 
Greece 65.9% 60.1% 68.2% 62.9% -5.8% -5.2% 
Ireland 68.2% 50.0% 68.0% 49.8% -18.2% -18.2% 
Italy 42.1% 39.8% 41.4% 40.7% -2.3% -0.7% 
Luxembourg 35.0% 38.8% 37.6% 43.9% 3.8% 6.3% 
Netherlands 69.2% 73.3% 68.2% 71.3% 4.2% 3.1% 
Portugal 39.6% 30.7% 37.6% 29.8% -8.8% -7.8% 
Spain 44.6% 49.9% 47.9% 49.8% 5.3% 1.9% 
       
Average 45.2% 43.9% 46.7% 45.3% -1.4% -1.4% 
 
Notes: T = SNG Transfer Receipts; D = SNG Deficit; R = SNG Revenue; E = SNG 
Expenditure 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on OECD data. 
 
III. Empirical Approach 
 To estimate the effects of decentralization and SNG receipt of transfers on social 
protection expenditures, I use two main empirical strategies, combined with various 
alternative measures of the main variables.   In each strategy country fixed effects are 
used to control for institutional (and other unobserved) differences across countries.  
The first strategy also allows time fixed effects. 
Each specification takes as the dependent variable a measure of social protection 
and regresses that on measures of decentralization or the VFI, a measure of the crisis 
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point, and fixed effects.  More specifically, the first strategy consists of a set of 
regressions of the following form: 
 
 
where SP is a measure of social protection, RY is a crisis indicator for country i in year t 
measured as a year with two quarters of negative growth for country i, D is a measure of 
decentralization for country i in year t, VFI is a measure of vertical fiscal imbalance for 
country in year t, C are country fixed effects and T represents time fixed effects.   
The second strategy takes the start of the Great Recession as the crisis point and 
compares the effects before and after the Great Recession using a difference-in-
difference approach where the Great Recession is defined as starting after 2007: 
 
 
Each strategy has its advantages but the difference-in-difference approach does not 
allow time effects to be included. 
 In addition to the two different strategies, the main variables are measured in 
different ways.  Social protection expenditures are measured alternatively in per capita 
terms and as a proportion of GDP.  Since the results are qualitatively similar, I report 
below only the results using social protection as a percent of GDP.   
The measure of decentralization is computed alternatively as SNG expenditures 
as a percent of total government expenditures or SNG revenues as a percent of total 
government revenue.  The vertical fiscal imbalance is computed in three alternative 
it 0 1 2 3 4 5(1) Log SP     *    u  it it it i t itRY D D RY C T           
it 0 1 2 3 4 5(2) Log SP     *    u  it it it i t itRY VFI VFI RY C T           
it 0 1 2 3 4(3) Log SP   07   * 07   u  t it it i itA D D A C         
it 0 1 2 3 4(4) Log SP   07   * 07   u  t it it i itA VFI VFI A C         
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ways.  Two are standard: transfers received by SNGs as a percent of total SNG revenues 
and as a percent of total SNG expenditures.  A third measure adds the SNG deficit to 
transfers in the numerator. 
 The point of recessionary crisis is also measured in two different ways 
depending on the specification.  In the first strategy, I compute negative GDP growth by 
quarter, and count any year with two quarters of negative growth as a recessionary year.  
This provides a country and year specific variable of a recession.  The second strategy 
employs a difference in difference approach where the “before” period is 2000-2007 
and the “after” period is 2008-2014. 
 In addition, I include a number of controls for socio-economic characteristics.  
Demographic differences and changes are controlled for by including the proportion of 
young (ages 15 to 29), the proportion of old (age 65 and older), and the proportion 
female.  The employment rate is also included and GDP is included in some 
specifications. 
 There are several econometric problems that need to be addressed.  As already 
mentioned, institutional differences between countries are controlled for using country 
fixed effects in both specifications.  The first approach also allows time fixed effects to 
be added, controlling for common shocks in the same year across countries.  The second 
approach defines the Great Recession shock as the period after 2008 so one cannot 
include year effects.  A second important econometric problem is that the VFI and 
decentralization variables are likely endogenous.  While we try to measure the crisis 
point, there is likely some error and it is not being measured perfectly.  Unmeasured 
parts of the shock may well affect both our SNG measures (decentralization and VFI) 
and social protection.  To correct for this I use lagged values for both the 
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decentralization variable and the VFI variable.  Finally the difference in difference 
approach is subject to the criticism that the same trend that occurs after 2007 could have 
occurred before 2007 as well.  I conduct a common trends test to see if this is the case.   
IV. Results 
A. Decentralization Results 
 I first present results for decentralization.  The main result that is consistent 
across most specifications is that greater decentralization lowers social protection as a 
percent of GDP.8  When using a year-specific crisis indicator of recession, the results 
are that this relationship does not change when in a crisis regardless of the measure of 
the dependent variable or the decentralization variable.  When using the D-D method 
the results generally show that after the Great Recession greater decentralization results 
in even lower social protection expenditures as a percent of GDP than before the crisis.9 
Tables 6A and 6B present results for the first empirical strategy when the 
dependent variable is the log of social protection expenditures as a percent of GDP.  In 
Table 6A the decentralization measure is SNG revenue as a proportion of total 
government revenue while in 6B it is SNG expenditures as a proportion of total 
government expenditures.  The specifications that include country and time fixed effects 
(columns 3 and 4) indicate that greater decentralization reduces social protection 
expenditures as a percent of GDP and a recession year increases social protection as a 
percent of GDP.  The insignificance of the interaction term indicates that the effect of 
decentralization does not change in a recession year.  
 
                                                          
8 This result also holds using social protection per capita as the dependent variable.  I do not present 
these results to save space. 
9 I conduct a common trends test using 2004 instead of 2007.  In contrast to before and after 2007, the 
results indicate no difference before and after 2004. 
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Table 6A: Decentralization and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(Decentralization measure = SNG revenue/ Total Government Revenues) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
Recession year 0.0198 0.0198 0.0470*** 0.0304*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0348) (0.0148) (0.00917) 
DecentR(-1) 0.374*** 0.374*** -0.273*** -0.296*** 
 (0.0911) (0.106) (0.102) (0.101) 
RY*DecentR(-1)  1.06e-05 -0.123  
  (0.206) (0.0865)  
propold 1.731*** 1.731*** -2.518*** -2.497*** 
 (0.553) (0.555) (0.747) (0.749) 
propyoung -5.307*** -5.307*** -0.810* -0.685 
 (0.524) (0.534) (0.482) (0.476) 
propfemale 1.367 1.367 -1.883 -1.248 
 (1.993) (2.001) (3.180) (3.161) 
employrate 1.147*** 1.147*** -1.559*** -1.552*** 
 (0.251) (0.252) (0.280) (0.281) 
Constant 2.679*** 2.679*** 5.441*** 5.083*** 
 (0.997) (1.002) (1.680) (1.668) 
     
Observations 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.631 0.631 0.955 0.955 
     
     
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6B: Decentralization and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(Decentralization measure = SNG expenditure/SNG Total Government Revenues) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
Recession year 0.0203 0.0140 0.0478*** 0.0296*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0349) (0.0146) (0.00915) 
DecentE(-1) 0.362*** 0.350*** -0.272*** -0.294*** 
 (0.0962) (0.111) (0.0985) (0.0981) 
RY*DecentE(-1)  0.0457 -0.146  
  (0.220) (0.0914)  
propold 1.718*** 1.721*** -2.494*** -2.471*** 
 (0.557) (0.559) (0.745) (0.749) 
propyoung -5.385*** -5.365*** -0.726 -0.609 
 (0.527) (0.538) (0.479) (0.476) 
propfemale 1.199 1.215 -0.726 -0.171 
 (2.006) (2.013) (3.139) (3.138) 
employrate 1.112*** 1.110*** -1.441*** -1.444*** 
 (0.255) (0.256) (0.284) (0.285) 
Constant 2.800*** 2.791*** 4.774*** 4.462*** 
 (1.002) (1.006) (1.659) (1.657) 
     
Observations 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.625 0.625 0.956 0.955 
     
     
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 7A and 7B present the difference-in-difference specification using social 
protection benefits as a percent of GDP as the dependent variable. Again the table 
labeled A presents results for the revenue measure of decentralization while the table 
labeled B presents the results for the expenditure measure of decentralization.  The final 
column (4) presents the results with fixed country effects and I concentrate on these 
results.  In both Tables 7A and 7B social protection expenditures are higher after 2007.  
Using the revenue measure in Table 7A indicates no effect of decentralization before 
2007 but that greater decentralization results in lower social protection expenditures 
after 2007.  Using the expenditure measure of decentralization in Table 7B the results 
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indicate greater decentralization lowers social protection expenditures before 2007 and 
that this is magnified after 2007.  
Table 7A: Decentralization and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(Decentralization measure = SNG revenue/ Total Government Revenues) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP  
     
After 2007 0.0695*** 0.0739*** 0.0709** 0.133*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0170) (0.0302) (0.0176) 
DecentR(-1)  0.386*** 0.375*** -0.168 
  (0.0868) (0.125) (0.120) 
A07*DecentR(-1)   0.0205 -0.214** 
   (0.174) (0.0935) 
GDP 9.49e-09 2.46e-09 2.59e-09 -1.79e-07 
 (1.29e-08) (1.24e-08) (1.25e-08) (1.09e-07) 
propold 1.279** 1.499** 1.486** -0.235 
 (0.630) (0.602) (0.614) (0.683) 
propyoung -4.742*** -4.476*** -4.471*** -2.329*** 
 (0.542) (0.545) (0.549) (0.458) 
propfemale 2.793 3.273 3.313 -13.60*** 
 (2.106) (2.025) (2.060) (3.169) 
employrate 1.223*** 1.101*** 1.097*** -1.401*** 
 (0.252) (0.243) (0.245) (0.374) 
Constant 1.901* 1.569 1.552 11.45*** 
 (1.053) (1.015) (1.028) (1.705) 
     
Observations 175 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.644 0.669 0.669 0.931 
     
Year FE No No No No 
Country FE No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7B: Decentralization and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(Decentralization measure = SNG expenditure/ Total Government Expenditures) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
After 2007 0.0695*** 0.0770*** 0.0608** 0.140*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0171) (0.0302) (0.0174) 
DecentE(-1)  0.391*** 0.335*** -0.277** 
  (0.0915) (0.126) (0.113) 
A07*DecentE(-1)   0.119 -0.285*** 
   (0.183) (0.0976) 
GDP 9.49e-09 2.92e-09 3.77e-09 -2.07e-07* 
 (1.29e-08) (1.25e-08) (1.26e-08) (1.06e-07) 
propold 1.279** 1.471** 1.384** -0.0358 
 (0.630) (0.605) (0.620) (0.668) 
propyoung -4.742*** -4.520*** -4.488*** -2.168*** 
 (0.542) (0.547) (0.551) (0.450) 
propfemale 2.793 3.239 3.479* -12.80*** 
 (2.106) (2.033) (2.070) (3.068) 
employrate 1.223*** 1.054*** 1.025*** -1.193*** 
 (0.252) (0.245) (0.249) (0.365) 
Constant 1.901* 1.618 1.522 10.93*** 
 (1.053) (1.018) (1.030) (1.649) 
     
Observations 175 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.644 0.666 0.667 0.934 
     
Year FE No No No No 
Country FE No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Greater decentralization is thus associated with lower social protection 
expenditures as a percent of GDP.  This is consistent with classic arguments that assign 
redistribution and stabilization to the central level of government.  If redistribution 
exhibits characteristics of a public good, each region would like to increase 
expenditures but is not convinced that other regions would do the same.  If social 
protection expenditures have positive spillovers, economic theory suggests that lower 
social protection expenditures should accompany greater decentralization. 
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B. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance Results 
 I next turn to results concerning the vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI).  The main 
results generally show that an increase in the VFI (measured using two standard 
definitions of VFI) lowers social protection but less so in a recession year or after 2007.  
A third measure of the VFI is used that includes transfers and the SNG deficit in the 
numerator.  The results using the third measure differ in two respects.  The third 
measure yields a smaller impact of the VFI on social protection expenditures than the 
first two measures; and the interaction term using the third measure implies a smaller 
difference of the impact of a smaller VFI in a recession year or after 2007.  Overall, the 
results suggest that (1) when not in crisis a greater VFI (relatively greater transfers or 
transfers plus deficit) results in spending on things other than social protection, (2) 
transfers are used in part to limit decreases in social protection in a crisis, and (3) the 
evidence on deficits suggests that SNG deficits are used to fund expenditures other than 
social protection. 
I again begin with the results from the first strategy.  Tables 8A and 8B present 
the results using the log of social expenditures as a percent of GDP as the dependent 
variable.  Table 8A uses transfers as a proportion of SNG revenue as a measure of VFI 
and Table 8B uses transfers as a proportion of SNG expenditures.  Columns (3) and (4) 
include fixed country and year effects.   Results for the full specification in column (3) 
indicate a negative coefficient for the lagged VFI and a positive coefficient for its 
interaction with the recession year in both Table 8A and 8B.  The recession year 
coefficient is negative and significant using the revenue measure in Table 8A but 
insignificant using the expenditure measure in 8B. 
The interpretation here is that if a country is not in a recession, higher transfers 
that create a larger VFI do not increase social protection expenditures, and in fact such 
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expenditures fall as a percent of GDP.  This implies that the larger VFI resulting from 
increased transfers relative to SNG expenditures increases spending on things other than 
social protection.  When in recession, higher transfers offset somewhat the negative 
impact of the VFI suggesting that in recessions greater transfers are helping to maintain 
social expenditure protection as a percent of GDP.  
 
Table 8A: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(VFI measure = SNG transfers/SNG Revenue) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
Recession year 0.0160 -0.0535 -0.0444* 0.0303*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0614) (0.0263) (0.00937) 
VFI1 (-1) 0.138** 0.108* -0.169** -0.144 
 (0.0540) (0.0598) (0.0851) (0.0873) 
RY*VFI1 (-1)  0.139 0.146***  
  (0.117) (0.0481)  
propold 1.779*** 1.763*** -2.244*** -2.697*** 
 (0.571) (0.571) (0.755) (0.763) 
propyoung -5.634*** -5.565*** -0.503 -0.534 
 (0.548) (0.551) (0.480) (0.494) 
propfemale 1.461 1.628 -3.294 -1.279 
 (2.086) (2.089) (3.240) (3.268) 
employrate 1.381*** 1.382*** -1.737*** -1.614*** 
 (0.263) (0.262) (0.281) (0.286) 
Constant 2.576** 2.495** 6.185*** 5.155*** 
 (1.052) (1.053) (1.712) (1.729) 
     
Observations 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.608 0.611 0.956 0.953 
     
     
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8B: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(VFI measure = SNG transfers/SNG Expenditure) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
Recession year 0.0174 -0.0357 -0.0281 0.0297*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0580) (0.0252) (0.00937) 
VFI2 (-1) 0.139*** 0.114** -0.153** -0.123 
 (0.0498) (0.0560) (0.0748) (0.0752) 
RY*VFI2 (-1)  0.103 0.109**  
  (0.107) (0.0443)  
propold 1.738*** 1.736*** -2.390*** -2.771*** 
 (0.568) (0.568) (0.758) (0.757) 
propyoung -5.622*** -5.560*** -0.472 -0.503 
 (0.544) (0.548) (0.489) (0.499) 
propfemale 1.688 1.791 -2.389 -0.634 
 (2.090) (2.093) (3.238) (3.219) 
employrate 1.398*** 1.397*** -1.692*** -1.601*** 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.283) (0.286) 
Constant 2.453** 2.403** 5.712*** 4.814*** 
 (1.054) (1.056) (1.708) (1.701) 
     
Observations 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.611 0.613 0.955 0.953 
     
     
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 9A and 9B repeat the analysis of Tables 8A and 18B but use an 
alternative measure of the VFI.  The alternative measure includes the deficit of the SNG 
as well as transfers in the numerator.  The results are similar. When not in a recession 
year, an increase in the VFI lowers social protection indicating that both transfers and 
deficit financing are being used to finance other sorts of expenditures.  In a recession 
year, the effect is mitigated somewhat. 
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Table 9A: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
VFI measure = (SNG Transfers + Deficit)/SNG Revenue 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
Recession year 0.0194 -0.0180 -0.0171 0.0289*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0561) (0.0243) (0.00940) 
VFI1 (-1) 0.131*** 0.112* -0.126* -0.0954 
 (0.0495) (0.0569) (0.0646) (0.0636) 
RY*VFI1 (-1)  0.0712 0.0861**  
  (0.101) (0.0420)  
propold 1.634*** 1.641*** -2.499*** -2.810*** 
 (0.569) (0.570) (0.762) (0.756) 
propyoung -5.563*** -5.514*** -0.476 -0.507 
 (0.543) (0.548) (0.495) (0.501) 
propfemale 2.077 2.119 -1.298 0.0565 
 (2.142) (2.146) (3.252) (3.222) 
employrate 1.372*** 1.372*** -1.629*** -1.571*** 
 (0.261) (0.262) (0.286) (0.288) 
Constant 2.272** 2.251** 5.123*** 4.433** 
 (1.083) (1.085) (1.714) (1.701) 
     
Observations 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.609 0.610 0.954 0.953 
     
     
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9B: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
VFI measure = (SNG Transfers + Deficit)/SNG Expenditure 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
Recession year 0.0202 0.000412 -0.000601 0.0289*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0515) (0.0226) (0.00942) 
VFI2 (-1) 0.115*** 0.104** -0.0870* -0.0645 
 (0.0434) (0.0508) (0.0515) (0.0492) 
RY*VFI2 (-1)  0.0360 0.0529  
  (0.0877) (0.0368)  
propold 1.589*** 1.600*** -2.652*** -2.857*** 
 (0.569) (0.571) (0.766) (0.755) 
propyoung -5.522*** -5.493*** -0.513 -0.540 
 (0.541) (0.547) (0.498) (0.500) 
propfemale 2.095 2.098 -0.660 0.198 
 (2.144) (2.149) (3.282) (3.241) 
employrate 1.367*** 1.366*** -1.605*** -1.576*** 
 (0.261) (0.262) (0.288) (0.289) 
Constant 2.269** 2.267** 4.789*** 4.355** 
 (1.083) (1.086) (1.730) (1.710) 
     
Observations 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.609 0.609 0.953 0.952 
     
     
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 10A and B present the results for the difference-in-difference approach 
using social protection expenditures as a percent of GDP as the dependent variable.  
When the revenue measure of the VFI is used in Table 10A, the last column which 
includes country fixed effects indicates no effect of the VFI on social protection 
expenditures before 2007 but a highly significant increase after 2007.10  This means that 
an increase in the VFI after 2007, likely due to an increase in transfers by governments, 
led to an increase in social protection expenditures as a percent of GDP. 
                                                          
10 I again conduct a common trends test using 2004 instead of 2007.  In contrast to before and after 
2007, the results again indicate no difference before and after 2004. 
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Table 10B uses the expenditure measure of VFI and indicates a negative impact 
on social protection expenditures prior to 2007 which is mitigated after 2007.  This 
suggests that increased transfers prior to 2007 were not resulting in increases in social 
protection expenditures but were used for expenditures other than social protection. 
 
Table 10A: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(VFI measure = SNG transfers/SNG Revenue) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
After 2007 0.0695*** 0.0730*** -0.0422 0.0375 
 (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0472) (0.0266) 
VFI1(-1)  0.167*** 0.0568 -0.123 
  (0.0563) (0.0694) (0.0979) 
A07*VFI1(-1)   0.237*** 0.124*** 
   (0.0902) (0.0462) 
GDP 9.49e-09 2.30e-08 2.64e-08* -2.04e-07* 
 (1.29e-08) (1.40e-08) (1.38e-08) (1.08e-07) 
propold 1.279** 1.103* 1.113* 0.213 
 (0.630) (0.626) (0.615) (0.686) 
propyoung -4.742*** -4.720*** -4.519*** -2.411*** 
 (0.542) (0.566) (0.561) (0.478) 
propfemale 2.793 4.419** 4.829** -10.56*** 
 (2.106) (2.201) (2.166) (3.043) 
employrate 1.223*** 1.288*** 1.302*** -1.131*** 
 (0.252) (0.251) (0.247) (0.367) 
Constant 1.901* 0.972 0.771 9.748*** 
 (1.053) (1.111) (1.093) (1.638) 
     
Observations 175 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.644 0.647 0.662 0.930 
     
Year FE No No No No 
Country FE No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10B: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
(VFI measure = SNG transfers/SNG Expenditure) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
After 2007 0.0695*** 0.0744*** -0.0198 0.0580** 
 (0.0181) (0.0175) (0.0462) (0.0263) 
VFI1(-1)  0.172*** 0.0868 -0.171** 
  (0.0522) (0.0645) (0.0861) 
A07*VFI1(-1)   0.186** 0.0816* 
   (0.0845) (0.0435) 
GDP 9.49e-09 2.55e-08* 2.84e-08** -2.29e-07** 
 (1.29e-08) (1.40e-08) (1.39e-08) (1.09e-07) 
propold 1.279** 0.998 0.980 0.270 
 (0.630) (0.626) (0.618) (0.695) 
propyoung -4.742*** -4.682*** -4.529*** -2.318*** 
 (0.542) (0.561) (0.558) (0.476) 
propfemale 2.793 4.868** 5.278** -10.72*** 
 (2.106) (2.211) (2.192) (3.030) 
employrate 1.223*** 1.300*** 1.301*** -1.135*** 
 (0.252) (0.250) (0.247) (0.368) 
Constant 1.901* 0.739 0.545 9.858*** 
 (1.053) (1.117) (1.107) (1.628) 
     
Observations 175 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.644 0.651 0.662 0.930 
     
Year FE No No No No 
Country FE No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 11A and 11B repeat the analysis of Tables 10A and 10B but use the 
alternative measure of the VFI that includes the deficit of the SNG as well as transfers 
in the numerator.  These results show a negative effect of the VFI on social protection 
expenditures and no difference after 2007.  Given the previous results indicating a 
positive effect of the VFI after 2007, this means that the SNG deficit is responsible for 
the coefficient becoming negative – that is, the result that a higher VFI lowers social 
protection expenditures when the VFI measure includes the deficit.  Further this 
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relationship does not vary after 2007.  Thus higher deficits are not being used to 
increase social protection expenditures; rather they are being used to fund other 
programs both in a crisis and out of a crisis. 
 
Table 11A: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
VFI measure = (SNG Transfers + Deficit)/SNG Revenue 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
After 2007 0.0695*** 0.0748*** -0.00159 0.0642** 
 (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0474) (0.0262) 
VFI2(-1)  0.154*** 0.0871 -0.176** 
  (0.0504) (0.0634) (0.0709) 
A07*VFI2(-1)   0.146* 0.0694 
   (0.0844) (0.0423) 
GDP 9.49e-09 2.12e-08 2.32e-08* -2.45e-07** 
 (1.29e-08) (1.37e-08) (1.37e-08) (1.08e-07) 
propold 1.279** 0.968 0.912 0.341 
 (0.630) (0.632) (0.629) (0.698) 
propyoung -4.742*** -4.625*** -4.523*** -2.310*** 
 (0.542) (0.562) (0.562) (0.471) 
propfemale 2.793 5.066** 5.452** -10.13*** 
 (2.106) (2.267) (2.263) (3.005) 
employrate 1.223*** 1.275*** 1.258*** -1.086*** 
 (0.252) (0.250) (0.249) (0.369) 
Constant 1.901* 0.651 0.485 9.534*** 
 (1.053) (1.145) (1.142) (1.612) 
     
Observations 175 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.644 0.648 0.655 0.930 
     
Year FE No No No No 
Country FE No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11B: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Social Protection Expenditures in a Recession 
VFI measure = (SNG Transfers + Deficit)/SNG Expenditure 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Log of social protection expenditures as percent of GDP 
     
After 2007 0.0695*** 0.0752*** 0.0299 0.0775*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0450) (0.0248) 
VFI2(-1)  0.135*** 0.0957* -0.138** 
  (0.0439) (0.0567) (0.0550) 
A07*VFI2(-1)   0.0825 0.0435 
   (0.0754) (0.0376) 
GDP 9.49e-09 2.06e-08 2.17e-08 -2.48e-07** 
 (1.29e-08) (1.36e-08) (1.37e-08) (1.08e-07) 
propold 1.279** 0.927 0.885 0.297 
 (0.630) (0.634) (0.635) (0.701) 
propyoung -4.742*** -4.576*** -4.521*** -2.338*** 
 (0.542) (0.562) (0.564) (0.467) 
propfemale 2.793 5.063** 5.302** -10.02*** 
 (2.106) (2.265) (2.274) (3.026) 
employrate 1.223*** 1.269*** 1.252*** -1.095*** 
 (0.252) (0.250) (0.250) (0.370) 
Constant 1.901* 0.659 0.562 9.478*** 
 (1.053) (1.143) (1.146) (1.623) 
     
Observations 175 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.644 0.648 0.651 0.929 
     
Year FE No No No No 
Country FE No No No Yes 





The Great Recession provides an opportunity to examine some fundamental 
questions regarding decentralization and the redistributive and stabilization functions of 
government.  Viewing the Great Recession as a shock, we examine the effect of 
decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance on social protection expenditures. 
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The main results of my paper indicate first that greater decentralization lowers 
social protection as a percent of GDP and that this relationship does not significantly 
change with the onset of a crisis.   Second, when not in crisis a greater VFI (relatively 
greater transfers or transfers plus deficit) lowers expenditures on social protection and 
results in spending on things other than social protection.  This result is less pronounced 
in a recession, suggesting that transfers are used in part to limit decreases in social 
protection in a crisis.  Third, the evidence when measuring the VFI with deficits 
included suggests that SNG deficits are used to fund expenditures other than social 
protection. 
The main policy conclusions from this analysis support the classic division of 
functions of government.  For both reasons of redistribution and stabilization, social 
protection expenditures are best assigned to the central level of government.  The 
evidence suggests that more decentralized systems provide less social protection and 
greater transfers or SNG deficits can be shifted to fund areas other than social 
protection. 
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